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Abstract
Following the introduction of the Safe Streets and Communities Act, mandatory minimum
penalties (MMPs) were greatly expanded in Canadian criminal law. This expansion has been
controversial, particularly in the context of drug crime. Through the lens of proposed
legislation, Bill C-5, this paper presents the arguments both for and against the use of MMPs in
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, with a particular focus on their potential to produce
cruel and unusual punishment. Ultimately, this paper argues that, on account of their many
downfalls, MMPs should have no place in Canadian drug law.
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1: Introduction and Context
The proliferation of mandatory minimum penalties (MMPs) in Canadian criminal law is
undoubtedly controversial. MMPs are a “tough on crime” sentencing tool enacted by
Parliament to prescribe minimum sentences in law for various offences. They are used in both
the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, reflecting legislative intent to
ensure harsh penalties for select crimes that are perceived to be most egregious.1 This means
that for some offences, all offenders must face the same minimum penalty regardless of the
circumstances of the crime. While some argue that MMPs are effective in mandating harsh
penalties to deter crime and ensuring consistency in sentencing outcomes, others point out
significant concerns with MMPs. Namely, they undermine the fundamental purpose and
principles of sentencing, displace judicial discretion, add further pressure to an already
overburdened justice system, rely on a flawed drug treatment court program, do not deter
crime, perpetuate systemic racism in the criminal justice system, and breach the Charter rights
of Canadians. On various accounts, courts have found that MMPs, as applied in the context of
drug crime, are unconstitutional, contrary to s.12 of the Charter.2 Despite MMPs being found to
produce cruel and unusual punishment,3 MMPs remain in place and their proposed removal
from various criminal offences is at the center of politically divisive debate in Parliament.

1

Kari Glynes Elliott & Kyle Coady, “Mandatory Minimum Penalties in Canada: Analysis and Annotated
Bibliography” (2016) Research and Statistic Division, Department of Justice Canada at 5.
2
Department of Justice Canada, “Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the Courts” (7 December 2021) online:
Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2021/12/mandatory-minimumpenalties-and-the-courts.html>.
3
R v Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13.; R v Dickey, 2016 BCCA 177.; R v Bradley-Luscombe, [2015] BCJ No, 1685.
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While there is much to be explored in relation to MMPs generally, this project narrows on
drug offences. The overwhelming majority of drug charges do not result in conviction.4 Yet,
according to a study by Canada’s Department of Justice, “between 2007/08 and 2016/17, drug
offences comprised 75% of all offences punishable by an MMP for which offenders were
admitted to federal custody.”5 As this illustrates, MMPs in the drug context are pervasive.

Canada is in the midst of an opioid toxicity crisis,6 despite total prohibition on narcotics. As
is clear from this paradox, banning drugs is not keeping people safe. Opioid use has driven a
significant increase in substance related deaths, hospitalizations, and emergency medical
service responses.7 Between January 2016 and December 2021, there were “29,052 apparent
opioid toxicity deaths” in Canada.8 In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a
dramatic increase in the number of opioid related deaths, averaging 21 deaths per day.9 It is
estimated that 96% of these deaths were accidental.10 The Canadian Centre on Substance Use
and Addiction suggests that several factors contribute to the opioid crisis, including a
contaminated illegal drug supply, increased exposure to prescription opioids, and opioid

4

Statistics Canada, Drug Related Offences in Canada, 2013, by Adam Cotter, Jacob Greenland, & Maisie Karam,
Catalogue no. 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 25 June 2015).
5
Department of Justice Canada, The Impact of Mandatory Minimum Penalties on Indigenous, Black and Other
Visible Minorities, by Research and Statistics Division (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada: October 2017)
Research and Statistics Division, at 3.
6
Government of Canada “Opioids,” (last modified 1 December, 2021), online: Government of Canada
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/health/campaigns/drug-prevention.html>.
7
Laura Hatt, “The Opioid Crisis in Canada” (2022) HillStudies, Library of Parliament, Publication No. 2021-23-E.
8
Government of Canada, “Opioid- and Stimulant-related Harms in Canada” (23 June 2022) at 5-7 online:
Government of Canada, Health: <https://health-infobase.canada.ca/substance-related-harms/opioids-stimulants>.
9
Ibid; “During the first year of the pandemic, there was a 96% increase in apparent opioid toxicity deaths (April
2020 – March 2021, 7,362 deaths), compared to the year before (April 2019 – March 2020, 3,747 deaths).”
10
Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, “Canada’s Opioid Crisis: What You Should Know” (2021)
online: <https://www.ccsa.ca/sites/default/files/2021-06/CCSA-Canada-Opioid-Crisis-What-You-Should-KnowPoster-2021-en.pdf>.
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tolerance and dependence. 11 Various other factors are also linked to drug use, addiction, and
death, particularly in light of hardships stemming from the pandemic. 12 In June 2022, the cochairs of the federal, provincial, and territorial Special Advisory Committee on the Epidemic of
Opioid Overdoses released a joint statement which pointed to several recent studies on the
opioid crisis, and emphasized “the critical need to expand access to high quality, evidencebased and innovative care to support people who use drugs.”13

A conundrum emerges in approaching drug regulation, in light of addiction and Canada’s
drug crisis, while efforts continue to establish a better way forward. There have been years of
calls for drug reform in Canada, with little traction. To a limited extent, harm reduction
strategies have been introduced to address the problem.14 However these often take a
temporary approach relying on emergency exemptions and provincial health policies as
opposed to fundamental changes to federal drug law.15 Across Canada, drug courts have

11

Ibid.
Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, “Mental Health and Substance Use During COVID-19:
Spotlight on Canadian Households with Young Children” (2021) online:
<https://www.ccsa.ca/sites/default/files/2021-05/CCSA-COVID-19-Mental-Health-Substance-Use-CanadianHouseholds-Children-Infographic-2021-en.pdf>;
Government of Canada, “Homelessness and substance-related acute toxicity deaths: a descriptive analysis of a
national chart review study of coroner and medical examiner data, (23 June 2022) online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/opioids/data-surveillance-research/homelessness-substancerelated-acute-toxicity-deaths.html>.
13
Government of Canada, “Joint Statement from the Co-Chairs of the Special Advisory Committee on the Epidemic
of Opioid Overdoses – Latest National Data on Substance-Related Harms” (23 June 2022) Public Health Agency of
Canada, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/news/2022/06/joint-statement-from-the-co-chairs-ofthe-special-advisory-committee-on-the-epidemic-of-opioid-overdoses--latest-national-data-on-substancerelated0.html>.
While opioids are the central focus of many discussions around drugs in Canada, there is also evidence to suggest
significant use, seizure, and harms associated with methamphetamine, particularly in the Prairie provinces. See:
Public Safety Canada, “Fall 2019 Law Enforcement Roundtable on Illicit Drugs: Meeting Summary” (2021) at 4.
14
Health Canada Expert Task Force on Substance Use, Recommendations on Alternatives to Criminal Penalties for
Simple Possession of Controlled Substances (Ottawa: Health Canada: 6 May 2021) at 1.
15
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44.
12
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emerged in response to the number of criminally accused people who are involved with
problematic substance use. While they can connect accused people with supports, they often
require a plea of guilt and rarely take into account the interconnected nature of addiction and
mental health, arguably criminalizing addiction. Compounding on these issues, is the notion
that Canada has indeed waged its own “war on drugs,” unjustly targeting Black and Indigenous
Canadians in its drug policies.16 In light of this complex web of problems, removing MMPs from
the drug context may begin to reverse some of the harms associated with the law as it stands.
That is, in part, what Bill C-5 proposes to do.

Thus, this major research project will discuss the effect of MMPs in sentencing drug
crime in Canada and assess the potential outcomes of the proposed Bill C-5. Said exploration is
to be framed around harm reduction, social justice, and access to justice while emphasizing the
needs of particularly vulnerable Canadians. As such, this project will begin by providing an
overview of the objectives and principles of sentencing. It will then explore MMPs, and their
place in the CDSA. Next, the legislative aims and Parliamentary status of Bill C-5 will be
discussed. Following that, the case to be made for and against the use of MMPs in the CDSA will
be outlined. This will be illustrated by debates of and submissions to Parliament as well as
academic explorations of MMPs. Finally, in assessing the potential effects of Bill C-5 on MMPs

16

Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, “Race, Crime and Criminal Justice in Canada” (2014) Canada Oxford Handbooks Online,
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199859016.013.020;
Faizal Mirza, “Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing and Systemic Racism” (2001) 39:2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
491-512.
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in the CDSA an argument will be made suggesting that repealing MMPs is a necessary step in
achieving justice in Canadian drug laws.
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2: Sentencing Objectives at Law
The Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) sets out drug specific sentencing
considerations which are to be weighed “without restricting the generality of the Criminal
Code.”17 Accordingly, before turning to drug specific sentencing legislation it is important to
outline the sentencing framework set out in the Criminal Code.

Part XXIII of the Criminal Code codifies the purpose, principles, and objectives of
sentencing. These are central considerations in crafting a just and reasonable sentence.
Sentencing is a fluid and individualized process, wherein sentencing judges consider the unique
factors that surround the particular offender and offence at bar. The fundamental principle of
sentencing is proportionality; a just sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the
offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility, taking into account their individual
circumstance.18 As stated at s.718 of the Code “the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to
protect society and to contribute […] to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just,
peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions,“ having regard to one or more of various
enumerated objectives. These objectives are denunciation, deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, reparations, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender.19 In
meeting these aims, s.718.2 notes that relevant aggravating and mitigating factors should be
taken into account in crafting an appropriate sentence.20 Of equal importance are the principles

17

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (S.C. 1996, c. 19) [CDSA] s.10(1).
Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46) [Criminal Code] s.718.1.
19
Criminal Code, s.718(a)-(f).
20
Ibid, s.718.2.
18
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of parity, totality, and restraint. This is to say that sentences are to be similar for similar
offenders, should be crafted globally where possible, and as minimally invasive as possible
while still meeting the aims of sentencing. In balancing these competing objectives, sentencing
judges are afforded a large degree of discretion.21 Sentencing judges are able to hear from the
prosecution, the defense, and the victim(s) to ensure that whichever sentence they impose fits
the crime committed, in those particular circumstances, by that particular offender.

With these guiding principles in mind, the fundamental purpose of sentencing for any
offence in the CDSA “is to contribute to respect for the law and maintenance of a just, peaceful
and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, and treatment in appropriate circumstances,
of offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community.”22 Additionally,
s.10(2) lists aggravating factors for the court to consider when imposing a drug related MMP. It
is statutorily aggravating on sentence if the offence was carried out using a weapon or violence,
or threat thereof, if the offence exposed someone under 18 years old to illegal drugs, or if the
offender was previously convicted of a designated substance offence.23

Where the Crown intends to seek a MMP in relation to a drug offence, there is a
requirement to give notice.24 Thus, the court is not required to impose a MMP where the Crown
has failed to give notice. Finally, in sentencing an offender under the CDSA, the court may delay

21

Allan Manson et al, Sentencing and Penal Policy in Canada, 3rd edn (Toronto: Emond Publishing: 2016) at 39.
CDSA, s.10(2).
23
CDSA, s.10(2)(a)-(c); As set out at s.2(1) CDSA, a designated substance offence means “(a) an offence under Part
I, except subsection 4(1), or (b) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in relation
to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a).”
24
CDSA, s.8.
22
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sentencing, such that the offender can participate in a drug treatment court or attend an
approved treatment program.25 Importantly, if an offender successfully completes one of these
treatment programs the court is not required to impose a MMP.26 As will be explored, this
exception may not be as accommodating as it appears on its face. Troublingly, as will be
argued, MMPs stand in direct contradiction to the guiding principles of sentencing as codified in
both the Criminal Code and CDSA.

25
26

CDSA, s.10(4).
CDSA, s.10(5).
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3: Mandatory Minimum Penalties
Mandatory minimum penalties (MMPs) are minimum sentences set out in law for particular
offences. They are legislated predetermined minimum punishments for particular offences.27 A
MMP does not always entail incarceration, and may include various other sanctions.28 Their
recent proliferation has attracted much judicial, academic, and political critique.29 This chapter
will begin by outlining the history of MMPs in Canada before turning to a discussion of MMPs in
the CDSA.

3.1: History of MMPs
MMPs are not a recent addition in Canadian criminal law. Rather, a small number of MMPs
have been present since Canada’s first Criminal Code, though they were intended to be an
“exception to the rule.”30 MMPs were first expanded by the Liberal Party in the 1990s as a
means of achieving stricter gun control, reaching a total of 9 MMPs in law.31 Following that,
“there was a further flourishing of [MMPs] in the 2000s and 2010s.”32 Currently, there are
nearly 100 total MMPs in Canadian criminal law.33 In 2012, as a part of the Conservative Party’s
“tough on crime” agenda, the Safe Streets and Communities Act (SSCA), an omnibus bill

27

Elliott & Coady, supra note 1 at 4.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Sarah Chaster, “Cruel, Unusual, and Constitutionally Infirm: Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Canada” (2018)
23 Appeal at 92.
31
Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2012)
SCLR 57 at 149.
32
Chaster, supra note 30 at 92.
33
Ibid.
28

10
encompassing nine previously failed bills, was passed.34 It introduced MMPs in relation to
various Criminal Code and CDSA offences, limited the availability of conditional sentence
orders, modified Canada’s youth criminal justice system, and shifted the law around record
suspensions.35 Where MMPs were introduced in the drug context, the SSCA was presented to
Canadians as a means of harshly penalizing serious organized drug crime. However, as will be
explored, these ends have not been achieved, and the SSCA intolerably targets “people with
addictions and other low-income people involved in criminal activity as a means of survival.”36

3.2: MMPs in the CDSA
Under the CDSA it is a crime to possess, obtain, traffic, import, export or produce any
listed controlled substance.37 Controlled substances are classified into six Schedules according
to their chemical makeup, level of seriousness or potential for harm, and thus the sanctions
associated with them.38 For example, trafficking a Schedule I or II substance is an indictable
offence which carries a punishment of up to life in prison,39 as well as a potential MMP based
on various criteria of the offence.40 Possession of a Schedule I, II or III substance is a hybrid
offence which can be sentenced much more leniently.41

34

Safe Streets and Communities Act (S.C. 2012, c. 1).
Government of Canada, “Safe Streets & Communities Act: Backgrounder” (last modified 22 February 2012)
online: Government of Canada < https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2012/02/safe-streets-communitiesact.html>.
36
Darcie Bennett & Scott Bernstein, “Throwing Away the Keys: The human and social cost of mandatory minimum
sentences.” (2013) at 1, online (pdf) : Pivot Legal Society
<http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pivotlegal/pages/395/attachments/original/1372448744/Final_Throwing
Away_lo-res_-_v2.pdf?1372448744>.
37
CDSA, ss.4-7.
38
Ibid, Schedules I-IV.
39
CDSA, s.5(3).
40
CDSA, s.6(3)(a.1), s.6(3)(b).
41
CDSA, s.4.
35
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Drug crime is prosecuted federally by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC).42
Just as any other Crown prosecutor, PPSC prosecutors are entitled to prosecutorial discretion as
delegated by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Deciding whether to prosecute a charge “is
among the most important decisions that will be made by Crown counsel.”43 Prosecutions must
be based on sufficient evidence and serve the interests of the public. In exercising this
prosecutorial discretion, counsel must act ethically, and fairly as a “minister of justice.”44 In
deciding whether to prosecute allegations, counsel must consider if there is a reasonable
prospect of conviction based on the available evidence and if the public interest in being served
in carrying out the prosecution.45 In determining if there is a reasonable prospect of conviction,
Crown counsel should consider the “availability, competence, and credibility of witnesses,”
admissibility of evidence to implicate the accused, any reasonable defences available to the
accused, and any Charter violations. While a probability of conviction is not required, there
must “be more than a bare prima facie case.”46 Where there is a reasonable prospect of
conviction, a prosecution should only be carried out where it is in the public interest to do so. In
weighing the public interest in a prosecution, Crown counsel should consider: “(1) the nature of
the alleged offence”; “(2) the nature of the harm caused by or the consequences of the alleged
offence”; “(3) the circumstances, consequences to and attitude of victims”; “(4) the level of

42

Public Prosecution Service of Canada, “About the PPSC” (last modified 28 August 2021), Public Prosecution
Service of Canada online: <https://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/bas/index.html>.
43
Public Prosecution Service of Canada, “Public Prosecution Service of Canada: Deskbook” (2020) at 2.3 online
(pdf): <https://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf>.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
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culpability and circumstances of the accused”; “(5) the need to protect sources of information”;
and “(6) confidence in the administration of justice.”47 If there is not a reasonable prospect of
conviction or public interest in prosecution, the charges are to be stayed or withdrawn.48 While
entitled to discretion, as a general rule, barring serious safety concerns, the PPSC is under
direction not to prosecute low-level personal possession of controlled substances contrary to
s.4 of the CDSA.49

Drug related MMPs are restricted to fact specific “serious drug offences including
trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, importing and exporting, and production”
relating to Schedule I and II substances.50 There are a total of seven carceral MMPs set out in
the CDSA, as the following chart illustrates. There are two MMPs on the books relating to
trafficking a substance contrary to s.5 of the CDSA. There is a minimum term of imprisonment
for 1 year if the offence is committed to benefit a criminal organization, with the use or threat
of violence or a weapon, or if the person was convicted or serving a term of imprisonment for a
designated substance offence within the last 10 years.51 The mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment for trafficking a Schedule I or II substance increases to 2 years if committed near
a school or anywhere else frequented by those under 18 years of age, if committed in a prison,
or if the person used the services of a person under 18 to commit the offence.52 Similarly,

47

Ibid.
Ibid.
49
Ibid, at 5.13.
50
Ibid, at 6.2.
51
CDSA, s.5(3)(a)(i).
The definition of designated substance offence is found at s.462.48(1) of the Criminal Code, which says any offence
other than simple possession.
52
CDSA, s.5(3)(a)(ii).
48
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importing or exporting contrary to s.6 of the CDSA is subject to two MMPs. Importing or
exporting a Schedule I substance that is not more than one kilogram, or any Schedule II
substance, carries a minimum term of one year imprisonment if committed for the purposes of
trafficking, the commission of the offence involved an abuse of a position of trust or authority,
or if the person had access to a restricted or authorized area in committing the offence.53 If the
offence involved more than one kilogram of a Schedule I substance, the minimum term of
imprisonment increases to two years.54 Finally, production of a substance contrary to s.7 of the
CDSA also carries three potential MMPs.55 Producing a Schedule I substance carries a minimum
term of imprisonment of three years if any s.7(3) factors apply,56 while producing a Schedule II
substance has a MMP of one year if the production is for the purpose of trafficking,57 and
eighteen months if production is for the purpose of trafficking and any s.7(3) factors apply.58 As
outlined above, if an offender participates in a drug treatment court or successfully completes
an approved treatment program under s.10(4) of the CDSA, the court is not statutorily required
to impose a MMP.

53

CDSA, s.6(3)(a).
CDSA, s.6(3)(a.1).
55
CDSA, s.7.
56
CDSA, s.7(2)(a).
57
CDSA, s.7(2)(a.1)(i).
58
CDSA, s.7(2)(a.1)(ii).
s.7(3) factors are: “(a) the person used real property that belongs to a third party in committing the offence;
(b) the production constituted a potential security, health or safety hazard to persons under the age of 18 years
who were in the location where the offence was committed or in the immediate area; (c) the production
constituted a potential public safety hazard in a residential area; or (d) the person set or placed a trap, device or
other thing that is likely to cause death or bodily harm to another person in the location where the offence was
committed or in the immediate area, or permitted such a trap, device or other thing to remain or be placed in that
location or area.”
54
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Offence
s.5(3)(a)(i)
trafficking a
Schedule I or II
substance

s.5(3)(a)(ii)
trafficking a
Schedule I or II
substance
s.6(3)(a) importing /
exporting a Schedule
I substance not more
than 1kg or Schedule
II substance
s.6(3)(a.1) importing
/ exporting
s.7(2)(a) production
of a Schedule I
substance

s.7(2)(a.1)(i)
production of a
Schedule II
substance
s.7(2)(a.1)(ii)
production of a
Schedule I substance

Circumstances of Offence which trigger
MMP
(A) committed to benefit a criminal
organization;
(B) use or threat of violence;
(C) carried, used, or threatened to use a
weapon;
(D) if convicted of a designated substance
offence within the last 10 years
(A) committed in or near a school or
anywhere else frequented by those under
18 years of age;
(B) committed in a prison;
(C) used the services of a person under 18
to commit the offence
(i) committed for the purposes of
trafficking; (ii) commission of the offence
involved an abuse of a position of trust;
(iii) authority or if the person used access
to a restricted or authorized
involved more than one kilogram of a
Schedule I substance
If any of the following s.7(3) factors apply:
(a) used real property that belongs to a
third party;
(b) production constituted a potential
security, health or safety hazard to
persons under 18 who were in the
immediate area of the offence;
(c) production constituted a public safety
hazard in a residential area;
(d) placed or permitted a trap that could
cause death or bodily harm in the area of
the offence
for the purpose of trafficking

MMP
1 year
imprisonment

Maximum
Penalty
Life
imprisonment

2 years
imprisonment

Life
imprisonment

1 year
imprisonment

Life
imprisonment

2 years
imprisonment
3 years
imprisonment

Life
imprisonment
Life
imprisonment

1 year
imprisonment

Life
imprisonment

Any s.7(3) factors apply (as listed above)

18 months’
imprisonment

Life
imprisonment
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As a result of recent constitutional challenges, which will be touched on below, the PPSC
is under direction not to seek a MMP for offences of trafficking or possession for the purpose of
trafficking of Schedule I or II drugs where; the offender carried a weapon contrary to
s.5(3)(a)(i)(C); the offender was previously convicted of a designated substances offence
contrary to s. 5(3)(a)(i)(D); the offence was committed in or near a school or other place
frequented by persons under 18 contrary to s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(A); and the offender involves a person
under 18 in the offence contrary to s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(C).59 In relation to these offences, prosecutors
are directed to seek an appropriate sentence based on principles of sentencing, aggravating
factors listed in s.10 of the CDSA, and the case law. Importantly, “in some instances the
appropriate sentence may exceed the MMP.”60

59
60

Public Prosecution Service of Canada, supra note 43, at 6.2.1
Ibid at 6.2.
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4: Bill C-5
Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances
Act, was introduced by Minister of Justice David Lametti on December 7, 2021. In the context of
this project, Bill C-5 repeals all MMPs included in the CDSA. The Bill was introduced as a part of
a Liberal campaign promise to reintroduce the former Bill C-22, in response to the Supreme
Court of Canada striking down MMPs. Bill C-5 “amends the Criminal Code and the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act to, among other things, repeal certain mandatory minimum
penalties, allow for a greater use of conditional sentences and establish diversion measures for
simple drug possession offences.”61 The Department of Justice Canada expressed that
addressing racial inequities in the criminal justice system, frequent Charter challenges, and the
failure to deter crime are the most pressing reason to take action to repeal MMPs.62

As of June 2022, Bill C-5 has passed all three readings in the House of Commons, two
readings in the Senate, and is currently at committee consideration.63 This chapter will begin by
briefly outlining all of the amendments to the CDSA proposed in Bill C-5 before touching on the
Bill’s progression through Parliament. In so doing, it will begin to provide context for the case to
be made for and against MMPs in the CDSA.

61

Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1st Sess, 44th Parl, 2021
(first reading 7 December 2021).
62
Department of Justice Canada, “Bill C-5: Mandatory Minimum Penalties to be repealed: Backgrounder” (last
modified 07 December 2021) online: Government of Canada < https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentjustice/news/2021/12/mandatory-minimum-penalties-to-be-repealed.html>.
63
LEGISinfo, “C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and Controlled Drugs and Substances Act: 44th Parliament,
st
1 Session November 22, 2021 to present,” (2022) online: https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/en/bill/44-1/C-5.
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4.1: Purpose
As the Bill stands following third reading in the House of Commons, Bill C-5 proposes
four central changes to the criminal law. First, it removes MMPs for fourteen Criminal Code
offences, including some firearms, weapons, and unauthorized sale of tobacco offences, though
retains MMPs for murder and serious gun trafficking offences. Second, it removes all MMPs
from the CDSA. Third, it reinstates the availability of Conditional Sentence Orders (CSO) for
various offences, including drug offences which were precluded from CSOs. Finally, it codifies a
diversion program for simple drug possession under s.4 of the CDSA. These “evidence-based
diversion measures” require law enforcement to consider “referring people to treatment
programs or other support services, rather than charging or prosecuting them for simple drugpossession offences.”64 Importantly, this provision provides for the following principles to be
taken into consideration:
“(a) problematic substance use should be addressed primarily as a health and social
issue;
(b) interventions should be founded on evidence-based best practices and should aim
to protect the health, dignity and human rights of individuals who use drugs and to
reduce harm to those individuals, their families and their communities;
(c) criminal sanctions imposed in respect of the possession of drugs for personal use
can increase the stigma associated with drug use and are not consistent with
established public health evidence;
(d) interventions should address the root causes of problematic substance use,
including by encouraging measures such as education, treatment, aftercare,
rehabilitation and social reintegration; and
(e) judicial resources are more appropriately used in relation to offences that pose a
risk to public safety.”65
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4.2: Progression Through Parliament
The First Reading of Bill C-5 was completed on December 7, 2021 and major speeches
were delivered on December 13, 2021.66 In Parliamentary debates and votes, Bill C-5 divided
the Conservative Party from the rest of the House of Commons.67 Following speeches and
debates, Second Reading was completed on March 31, 2022 before the legislation was referred
to be considered by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in May of 2022.

In reviewing Bill C-5, the Committee had the benefit of thirty-two briefs submitted by
diverse special interest organizations. Five organizations who submitted briefs acknowledged
that some parts of Bill C-5 were beyond the scope of their submission and did not comment on
drug policy. As such, their briefs have not been considered here. Generally speaking, of the
twenty-seven briefs that touched on drug crime and MMPs, twenty-six were expressly
supportive of Bill C-5 to the extent that it repeals MMPs from the CDSA. This is not to say that
supporters were uncritical of Bill C-5. Rather, there was a general consensus of the need to
repeal MMPs from the CDSA, while also advocating for amendments that would go much
further in addressing various other health, social, and economic harms of the criminalization of
drugs. Further, several groups convincingly recommended a model of decriminalization,
endorsing the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition’s proposal entitled “Decriminalization Done Right:
A Rights-Based Path for Drug Policy.”68 Their central critiques of Bill C-5 were in its failure to
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take a decriminalized approach to drug policy, emphasizing further need for rehabilitative and
preventative strategies. Of the twenty-seven briefs that directly touched on MMPs in the CDSA,
one does not explicitly support the removal of MMPs from the drug context and suggests that
removing MMPs may be a concern to public safety.69

Ultimately, following the Report Stage and amendments to the language around the
principles of evidenced based diversion measures, the Third Reading of Bill C-5 was completed
on June 15, 2022. It was agreed to in a vote of 206 Yea’s to 117 Nay’s.70 Unsurprisingly, all of
those opposed are members of the Conservative Party – the same Party that initially expanded
MMPs into drug law. First and Second Reading in the Senate were completed on June 16, 2022
and June 22, 2022 respectively before the Bill was referred for committee consideration. Thus
far, there have been two briefs submitted to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs for consideration. The only one relevant to these purposes was submitted
by the Canadian Criminal Justice Association and is strongly in support of Bill C-5. However,
much like supporters at the House of Commons stage, they are critical of what the Bill fails to
accomplish and suggest that much more must be done in addressing the harms of MMPs and
the criminalization of drugs. At the time of writing, the Bill remains at the committee
consideration stage in the Senate.
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5: The Case for MMPs in the CDSA
As evidenced by recent division in Parliament, there is contention around the role of MMPs
in Canadian criminal law. Politicians, actors in the criminal justice system, academics, and
advocates take various stances on the use of MMPs. Those in support of MMPs typically
suggest they reduce disparity in sentencing through limiting judicial discretion and respond to
public perception of the need to harshly punish serious crime.71 The following section will
address these arguments in further detail.

a) Harsh Sentences
It has been suggested that the popularity of MMPs is rooted in a general distrust of the
judiciary and public opinions of sentencing as ineffective and lenient.72 For example, in his
response speech in the House of Commons, Conservative MP Michael Barret suggested that
removing MMPs via Bill C-5 “would do nothing more than reduce punishments, and truly
reduce accountability, for… drug dealers.”73 MMPs address this public concern by statutorily
ensuring a strict sentence particularly for crimes which are deemed “especially egregious or
irredeemable.”74 Thus, some contend that “it is difficult to argue that the penalties imposed are
unfit since they apply only to very serious conduct.”75 By ensuring harsh sentences, MMPs are
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thought to achieve both general and specific deterrence.76 Proponents suggest MMPs further
achieve sentencing goals by incapacitating offenders and sending a clear message of society’s
condemnation of particular acts.77 Further, it has been suggested that the hybrid nature of
some offences which are subject to MMPs operates as a “safety valve” wherein the Crown can
exercise their discretion and choose to proceed summarily if a MMP would be unduly harsh or
beyond the conscience of the public.78 MMPs are thought to be an expression of public will in
Canada’s democracy. They are a political tool often used to reflect public opinion of those who
believe in the efficacy of a tough on crime approach.79

b) Decreased Sentencing Disparity
In restricting sentencing discretion, MMPs address concerns around so called “judgeshopping” wherein advocates aim to have cases heard by particular judges who have
reputations for their general attitude towards sentencing.80 This concern reflects the position
that there is vast sentencing disparity in judicial outcomes in Canada. Supporters of MMPs
suggest that legislated uniformity in sentencing reduces said sentencing disparity. As such,
anyone who commits an offence that is subject to a MMP, regardless of “intersectional factors”
which have been seen to contribute to vast sentencing disparity, will be subject to the same
minimum sentence.81 In this way, relying on MMPs as a “bastion against the idiosyncrasies of
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the sentencing judge” can establish consistency and predictability in sentencing, thus
contributing to the rule of law.82

In their submission to the House of Commons, The National Police Federation suggests that
“Bill C-5 cannot achieve its objectives.”83 They reason that removing MMPs in the CDSA will
have little impact on Canada’s drug crisis because of the discretion already afforded to police
officers and the PPSC in charging and prosecuting those who use drugs.84 While supportive of
expanded investment in “programs such as addiction treatment, rehabilitation and diversion,”
particularly in underfunded rural communities, they are critical of the Bill’s ability to do so.85
The same position was advanced by MP Michael Barret who highlighted the Bill’s limitations in
substantively connecting those in need with supports; removing MMPs is not the same as
implementing harm reduction and rehabilitative strategies – which are essential moving
forward.86

Emphasizing how deadly the drug crisis has been and continues to be, the National Police
Federation asserts that “reducing penalties related to trafficking and importing controlled
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substances may undermine efforts to control the opioid epidemic.”87 They suggest that through
incapacitation, MMPs ensure public safety. As such, a softening of this approach without
coinciding increased deterrence measures, border control measures, and police and community
resources would be dangerous for victims of drug trafficking. However, as will be further
explored, advocating for the repeal of MMPs, via the passage of Bill C-5, is not a suggestion that
duly strict sentences should not or would not be consistently imposed. Rather, in removing
MMPs from the CDSA, judges will have the necessary discretion to adequately apply the
foundational principles of sentencing in light of the total circumstances of the offence. The
outcome of R v Nur is illustrative of this point. While the particular MMP was struck down, the
court, properly able to exercise discretion, imposed lengthy sentences for each offender as
necessitated by the circumstances of their crime.88
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6: The Case Against MMPs in the CDSA
While the above rationales have contributed to the conditions under which MMPs have
flourished, there is a significant opposition to the use of MMPs. Those who oppose MMPs
suggest that their effects are detrimental on various fronts.89 In 1987, the Canadian Sentencing
Commission (CSC) published their Report on Sentencing Reform which recommended the total
abolition of MMPs, save for murder and high treason.90 This report pointed to various flaws
associated with MMPs including constitutional concerns, their failure to deter crime, and their
propensity to lead to arbitrary detention.91 This section will explore criticisms of MMPs in
greater detail.

a) The Loss of Proportionality
At their core, MMPs interfere with the fundamental principle of sentencing –
proportionality – by painting all offenders with the same brush. As opined by the CSC, MMPs
“do not reflect the reality of the wide range of circumstances in which offences are committed
and in which offenders find themselves.”92 MMPs “represent a priori political judgement about
what is a just punishment in all circumstances,”93 directly offending the principle of
proportionality. The Supreme Court of Canada has been critical of MMPs to that end because
“they emphasize denunciation, general deterrence and retribution at the expense of what is a
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fit sentence for the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm
caused by the crime.”94 Depriving sentencing judges of the discretion to impose proportionate
sentences is an affront to the aims of sentencing and perpetuates significant harms associated
with MMPs.

Troublingly, the erosion of proportionality sees high-level ‘ring leaders’ face the same
starting point in sentencing ranges as those who become involved with drug crime in order to
meet their own addiction needs, despite a clear difference in moral culpability.95 In light of that,
MMPs have been referred to as “inflationary floors”96 because they set the minimum sentence
for the best offender, while offenders with less sympathetic circumstances may face sentences
much harsher than the minimum, inexorably leading to longer sentences overall.97 This has
significant economic impacts which will be further explored and does not adequately achieve
rehabilitative aims. Further, despite dated arguments to suggest that MMPs are an expression
of democratic will of Canadians, a 2017 National Justice Survey revealed that 91% of Canadians
indicated that judges should be granted the flexibility to impose less restrictive sentences
outside of MMPs.98
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Problematically, and disproportionately, MMPs target and incarcerate “the wrong people”
in the drug trade.99 For example, MMPs catch low level offenders who are struggling with
problematic substance use themselves, and are “easily replaced in the illicit market,”100 while
high-level organizers are often better positioned to use their inside knowledge as leverage to
avoid MMPs in plea bargaining.101 A 2012 study by the Pivot Legal Society on the life stories of
those initially impacted by the SSCA in Vancouver, illustrates this point. The study found that
the provisions of the SSCA, including MMPs in the drug context, were intended to target
organized drug crime, but in reality they predominately affect and do not deter those living in
deep poverty and with addiction.102

As outlined above, an offender may face a MMP where they have been convicted of a
designated substance offence in the last ten years. A designated substance offence is any drug
offence, save for simple possession, under Part 1 of the CDSA. Given the chronic nature of
addiction, as corroborated by the Pivot Legal Society study, many people living with drug
dependency have previously been convicted of a designated substance offence.103 As such, the
designated substance offence provision targets those who are drug dependant and had the
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potential to “put hundreds of people in jail who would be better off in treatment or being
supported in accessing harm reduction services.”104

Additionally , an offender can be subject to a MMP where an offence is committed to the
benefit of a criminal organization. However, the meaning of ‘organized crime’ is quite broad.
Under s.467.1(1), a criminal organization is any group of three or more people that has the
commission of a crime as their main purpose.105 This means that if three “drug users involved in
street-level sales for survival purposes” were to be working together to facilitate a drug deal,
they could be subject to a minimum level of incarceration.106 While hypothetical, that kind of
incidental shared effort is caught by MMP legislation, despite it not being the work of a highly
organized drug operation. The participants in the Pivot Legal Society study felt that, contrary to
the intention of Parliament, because of the insulated nature of those who organize drug crime
and the exposed nature of those on the street who distribute drugs, the organized crime
provision would “allow higher-level drug traffickers to continue escaping arrest and prosecution
while leaving easily replaceable street-level dealers to potentially face longer sentences.”107

Further, an offender could face a MMP where they commit a drug crime in proximity to a
school or any place that minors frequent. The breadth and vagueness of this statement means
that many feel that this could describe “just about any place in their community.”108 Thus, by
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inflating the minimum sentence, proportionality is threatened and low level offenders are more
likely to take the brunt of a disproportionate heavy handed sentencing scheme. These
significant harms associated with MMP legislation in the CDSA have been judicially recognized.
PPSC Crowns are now under direction not to seek MMPs in these circumstances, as a result of
constitutional challenges. Entirely removing MMPs from the CDSA would codify this approach
and ensure that judges are consistently able to apply the principle of proportionality at
sentencing.

b) Displaced Discretion
Proponents suggest that MMPs remove judicial discretion to ensure consistency in
sentencing outcomes, while opponents point out that judicial discretion is questionably
misplaced. Rather, discretion is transferred from the judiciary to prosecutors. Where MMPs are
concerned, prosecutors’ decisions carry significant weight on sentence; “prosecutors can trigger
mandatory minimums by charging crimes that carry those sentences; by proving certain
aggravating factors at sentencing; by refusing to accept guilty pleas to lesser offences that do
not carry mandatory minimums; or by electing to proceed summarily or by indictment where
that election entails a particular mandatory minimum.”109 As Ministers of Justice, prosecutors
are to act dispassionately in ensuring that justice is done. To that end, prosecutors are afforded
a large degree of discretion in their decision making; “prosecutorial discretion is ‘expansive’ and
must be insulated from most types of review.”110 While sentencing judges give reasons for their
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decisions, which are subject to public scrutiny and appeal, prosecutors’ reasons for seeking an
MMP are neither made public, nor subject to challenge or review.111 In that sense, prosecutors,
as opposed to judges, have a large degree of control over sentencing outcomes where MMPs
are concerned. Supporters of MMPs suggest that removing judicial discretion for certain crimes
achieves greater certainty and consistency in sentencing outcomes. However, in that discretion
is merely transferred, MMPs do not remove discretion. This transfer of discretion and insulation
of decision making threatens transparency and accountability in the criminal justice system.112

Further, as a result of the transfer of discretion to prosecutors, the proliferation of MMPs
has been linked to an increase in “charge bargaining.”113 As a result of the charge bargaining
process, offenders may face pressures to plead guilty to a lesser offence so as to avoid being
sentenced to a MMP. Met with the decision to risk facing a conviction that carries a certain
MMP or to plead guilty to a lesser offence which does not, “the incentives for an innocent
accused to plead guilty become particularly powerful and clear.”114 Thus, increased pressure to
plead guilty can increase the risk of wrongful conviction.115 This is not to say that all guilty pleas
as a result of charge bargaining are pressured or could result in a wrongful conviction, but
rather that the risk certainly exists where MMPs are concerned.116 Thus, the transfer of judicial
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discretion to prosecutors through MMPs does not ensure consistency in sentencing and
endangers the rule of law via risk of wrongful conviction.

c) Further Burdening the Criminal Justice System
MMPs carry significant implications on the efficiency of the criminal justice system. MMPs
lead to increased court, correctional and “hard-to-calculate” social costs.117 In his speech in the
House of Commons, MP Gary Anandasangaree noted that “so-called tough-on-crime measures
have actually made our criminal justice system less effective by discouraging the early
resolution of cases.”118 While on one hand, it has been suggested that the risk of facing an
MMP could incentivize guilty pleas, on the other hand it has been suggested that MMPs can
increase trial frequency. Because of the high stakes, people facing a MMP are sometimes more
likely to take their case to trial, rather than to resolve it outside of the courtroom,119 “in fear of
the significant penalty that awaits them should they be found guilty.”120 As suggested by the
Canadian Criminal Justice Association in their submission to the House of Commons, “not only
does this increase time for specific case resolution in an already overburdened criminal justice
system, but increased litigation because of MMPs increases court delay, generally, which
negatively impacts victims.”121 The Canadian Bar Association’s submission echoes this point,
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and further noted that as a result of MMPs, offenders who choose to go to trial to attempt to
avoid an MMP “languish in pre-trial custody, unable to meaningfully begin or complete the
process of rehabilitation.”122 It is difficult to quantify the precise cost of these pressures on the
criminal justice system. However, given the criminal justice system’s dependence on pre-trial
resolutions, increased trial frequency is not ideal. Through increased litigation, MMPs can
significantly delay court processes, further burdening an already overwhelmed system.

Further, MMPs “increase costs on an overburdened justice system by leading to higher
rates of incarceration.”123 Mandatory incarceration can increase prison populations despite the
fact that they are already unsustainably high. This has in some jails lead to “triple-bunking,” and
means that limited education and rehabilitation programs are increasingly less available to
inmates.124 Where budgets are invested in lengthy litigation and incarceration, but not matched
in treatment and social policies, it is hard to see how the CDSA’s rehabilitative and treatment
aims are being met.125 Thus, it is clear that, in relying on MMPs, with little regard to their effect
on the criminal justice system, policy makers are not concerned with addressing the root causes
of addiction and crime but rather with removing those who use drugs from society.126
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d) Drug Treatment Court Flaws
Rehabilitation is central to the fundamental purpose of sentencing as codified in the CDSA.
As such, s.10(5) provides that an offender can evade facing a MMP where they participate in
drug treatment court or complete an approved drug treatment program. These options may
present as a means of mitigating the risk that MMPs target those who are dealing with
addiction.127

However, the inaccessibility of drug treatment courts means that rehabilitative aims of the
s.10(5) drug treatment provision often cannot be met.128 Drug treatment courts are often
inaccessible and often built on a flawed philosophical understanding of addiction.129 Across
Canada, there are a total of twenty-five drug treatment courts.130 Given the size of this country,
there are significant geographical barriers to entry.131 Those living in remote communities,
without access to reliable transportation may be barred from participating in drug treatment
courts, and thus prevented from benefiting from s.10(5).

Even where an accused person is able to access a drug treatment court, the courts are
premised on “the position that drug dependence is a matter of free will rather than a complex
medical condition.”132 Further, many consider drug treatment courts to be coercive measures
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that can do more harm than good.133 As suggested in the brief submitted to the House of
Commons by the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition, there are human rights concerns raised by
drug treatment courts: “coercion, intrusive judicial supervision, and the potential for sanctions
(including jail time) for drug use, breach of conditions, or missed treatment sessions, urine
tests, or court appearances.”134 As such, most participants do not successfully complete drug
treatment court programs. A 2015 report by the Department of Justice Canada found that at
that time, drug treatment courts had “a retention rate of 36% and a graduation rate of 27%.”135
The study further found that the primary reason for failure to complete the program was most
often because participants breached program guidelines or re-offended.136 It should be noted
that not all of those involved in this particular study were participating in a drug treatment
court as a result of a drug crime carrying a MMP. Drug treatment courts are available to a
variety of offenders. Nevertheless, the study indicates that the success of those who participate
in drug treatment courts is limited.137 Compounding on this is the fact that in order to
participate in a drug treatment court the accused must plead guilty. Those who plead guilty to
participate in and do not complete drug treatment court are then forced to return to the
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traditional justice system having plead guilty, raising concerns for the legal rights of those
struggling with addiction.138

e) No Evidence of Deterrent Effect
General deterrence, or the idea that harsh penalties consequently reduce crime, is a central
justification for the use of MMPs. The “deterrence through sentencing hypothesis,” as
described by Anthony Doob, Cheryl Webster and Rosemary Gartner, rests on the assumption
that the perception of the certainty of harsh sanctions will weigh in the mind of those deciding
whether, or not, to commit a crime.139 Practically speaking, there is difficulty in evaluating the
precise deterrent effect of particular legislation, whether it be positive or negative.140 However,
available evidence does not support the suggestion that harsh penalties deter crime. Rather, in
reviewing a breadth of materials on the deterrent effect of harsh sentences and MMPs, Doob,
Webster and Gartner concluded that they “know of no reputable criminologist who has looked
carefully at the overall body of research literature on ‘deterrence through sentencing’ who
believes that crime rates will be reduced, through deterrence, by raising the severity of
sentences handed down in criminal courts.”141 Indeed, the perceived link between harsher
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penalties and deterrence has been described as a “null hypothesis” because there is in fact no
real link between harsh sentences and general deterrence.142

The limited deterrent effect of harsh sentences is also evident in the case of MMPs; “there
is little evidence to support the hope that mandatory penalties of imprisonment, which may not
even be known to the general public, will serve as effective deterrents of [crime].”143 Because
there is no evidence to suggest that MMPs have reduced drug use or crime “in any measurable
way,”144 it can be said that MMPs “are not effective as a crime-control strategy.”145 Data
published by Statistics Canada on trends in police-reported rates of drug offences in Canada
between 1986 and 2020 illustrates this point.146 Police-reported drug offences included
possession, trafficking, production, importation and exportation. Offences were further
categorized by type of drug; cannabis, cocaine, or other drugs (including heroin,
methamphetamines, and opioids). Following decriminalization in 2018, there was a sharp
decline in police reported cannabis offences.147 However, between 2012 and 2020, following
the 2012 proliferation of MMPs in the CDSA, there was only a minimal, but not significant,
decrease in offences involving cocaine and there was a notable increase in offences involving
other drugs.148 In 2012, police reported crime for other drugs at a rate of 52 per 100,000
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population. By 2020, police reported crime for other drugs at a rate of 102 per 100,000, almost
doubling in that time period.149 As for the decrease in cocaine related crime, the study notes
that this may not be indicative of a general decrease in drug use, because “the polysubstance
nature of the opioid crisis may impact how particular drug offences, namely those related to
methamphetamine and cocaine, are reported, given that only one drug type will be indicated as
the most serious violation for a particular criminal incident.”

It is important to note that the usefulness of this data in this context is somewhat limited.
This data represents trends in all drug crime, not just that which is subject to MMPs. Further,
other phenomena, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, may be responsible for upward trends in
drug crime during this period. With these caveats in mind, this data certainly cannot be taken as
a suggestion that MMPs have effected a reduction in drug crime overall. Rather, this data
generally supports the assertion that proliferating MMPs in drug law does not have a notable
deterrent effect on drug crime.

While there is difficulty in quantifying the deterrent effect, or lack thereof, of MMPs, the
general consensus is clear. The sentiment of McIntyre J in R v Smith continues to ring true; “it is
apparent, and here no evidence is needed for we ‘should not be ignorant as judges of what we
know as men’ […] that the minimum sentence provided in s. 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act has
not reduced the illicit importation of narcotics to the extent desired by Parliament and probably
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no punishment, however severe, would entirely stem the flow into this country.”150 Several
years later, rates of drug related crime and incarceration remain high, so MMPs cannot be said
to have effectively deterred drug crime.

Thus, MMPs justified through deterrence are something of a false promise; “as long as the
public believes that crime can be deterred by legislatures or judges through harsh sentences,
there is no need to consider other approaches to crime reduction.”151 This is to say that as long
as Canadians are satisfied that drug crime is punished harshly, there is little motivation to
consider the social and economic underpinnings of Canada’s drug economy which drive drug
crime.

f) Racial Bias
Perhaps the most problematic, and yet least surprising, aspect of MMPs is their unequal
application to Black and Indigenous offenders. It is well established that harsh drug policies
intolerably disproportionately affect Black and Indigenous Canadians. Systemic racism is
evident at all stages of the criminal justice system, and it is theorized that this is no different
where MMPs are concerned; “scholars have pointed to minimum sentences as having
particularly troublesome consequences for Aboriginal peoples, with serious concerns also
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raised about disparate racial impacts and the manner in which mandatory minimums have
contributed to gender inequities in the criminal law.”152

There are limited statistics available on incarceration rates for drug related convictions
carrying MMPs, however, data from the Correctional Service of Canada collected between
2007/08 and 2016/17 indicates that, as opposed to White offenders, “Black and other visible
minority offenders were much more likely to be admitted [to federal custody] with a conviction
for an offence punishable by a MMP.153 The same study reveals that over that time period drug
offences accounted for 75% of convictions for which offenders entered federal custody.154 Of
those offences, 89% were for trafficking.155 When further broken down by race and offence
type, while Black offenders were more likely to be incarcerated for importation or exportation
offences, “White offenders were more likely to be admitted with a trafficking (s. 5 of the CDSA)
or production (s. 7 of the CDSA) offence – they comprised 63% and 72% of these two groups,
respectively, over the ten year period.”156

A report by Statistics Canada, indicates that “[of] the total Canadian population, 2.9% of
people self-identify as Black, 4.3% as Indigenous and 16.2% as ‘other’ visible minorities.”157
However, again between 2007/08 and 2016/17, of offenders incarcerated for an offence under
s.6 of the CDSA, 42% were Black and 12% were Indigenous. Thus, Black and Indigenous
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offenders are statistically overrepresented in incarceration related to importation and
exportation of substances. The most significant increase in overrepresentation of Indigenous
offenders’ conviction rates for s.6 offences occurred following the introduction of the SSCA,
which proliferated MMPs in drug law.158 These figures do not suggest that Black and Indigenous
Canadians are overrepresented in incarceration for all drug related crime carrying MMPs,
however they do indicate significant overrepresentation for some offences, which alone cannot
be tolerated.

Overrepresentation is not indicative of Black and Indigenous groups committing drug crime
or using drugs at an elevated rate.159 Rather, overrepresentation is borne from racial bias
permeating all levels of the criminal justice system.160 There is significant data to suggest an
over-policing of Black communities in Canada, which means that Black Canadians are inherently
subject to an increased risk of being affected by a MMP,161 despite the fact that “the best
criminological evidence suggests that the vast majority of drug users and sellers are white.”162
Indeed, it has been suggested that “the impact of racial profiling and the poor use of
prosecutorial discretion are even more severe under mandatory prison sentencing laws: Black
people who are unfairly and disproportionately targeted for criminal investigations will likely
succumb to more guilty pleas, stiffer penalties, and higher incarceration rates.”163 As previously
outlined, MMPs shift judicial discretion into the hands of prosecutors, and it has further been
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suggested that Black and Indigenous Canadians are “less likely to benefit from exercises of
prosecutorial discretion,” reflecting systemic biases.164 This is to say that where MMPs are
flawed in many regards, their ramifications disproportionately affect Black offenders as a result
of systemic bias.

The well-established overrepresentation of Indigenous Canadians in incarceration led to
judicial recognition of the lasting impacts of colonialism in R v Gladue165 and the codification of
s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code which says that “all available sanctions other than
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders,
with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.”166 It is “exceedingly
difficult to reconcile” these principles with the use of MMPs.167 Thus, the Native Women’s
Association of Canada expressed support of Bill C-5 to the House of Commons because
repealing MMPs “allows judges to meaningfully engage Gladue principles at sentencing,” which
is essential in advancing reconciliation.168 To illustrate, the “vast majority” of Indigenous
offenders encounter the criminal justice system as a result of intergenerational trauma,
stemming from state inflicted colonialism.169 Further, compounding on issues associated with
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drug treatment courts as outlined above, even where an Indigenous offender may evade a
MMP by completing an approved treatment program, “the irony in coercing the offender to
revisit and cope with that trauma in the way the state deems acceptable is palpable.”170 As
such, it is concerning to limit judicial discretion via MMPs such that judges are prevented from
applying Gladue principles at sentencing. Thus, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee called
upon Parliament “to allow trial judges, upon giving reasons, to depart from mandatory
minimum sentences.”171 In removing MMPs from the CDSA, via passage of Bill C-5, Parliament
can begin to meet that call to action.

The criminogenic social conditions in which Black and Indigenous Canadians often exist are
unjustly erased from sentencing considerations when judges are bound by MMPs, perpetuating
intolerable systemic race-based inequity in the criminal justice system.172 As suggested in a
brief by the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, over-policing, overrepresentation, and
overincarceration of Black and Indigenous Canadians “proceeds to negatively influence every
portion of their lives” including issues securing housing, employment and adequate health and
social services.173 MP Randall Garrison’s speech to the House of Commons on Bill C-5,
suggested that Bill C-5 could be strengthened by including automatic expungement for criminal
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records around drug possession, as a means of further addressing racial inequity.174 Removing
MMPs will not in and of itself erase systemic bias from the criminal justice system, however it
can “reduce the harm [Black and Indigenous offenders] face by allowing judges to consider a
sentence that balances the impact of the crime with their personal circumstance.”175

g) Constitutional Concerns
MMPs are not in and of themselves unconstitutional. However, one of the most significant
criticisms of MMPs is their potential to produce unjust sentences, infringing on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms176. As of December 2021, the Department of Justice Canada
was tracking 217 Charter challenges to MMPs.177 Section 12 of the Charter is most commonly
invoked in challenging the constitutionality of MMPs.178 Section 12 reads “everyone has the
right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual punishment or treatment.”179 As briefly
touched on above, there have been several constitutional challenges to MMPs on these
grounds. The following section will outline some of these, highlighting their relevance to the
debate around MMPs in the drug context.
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The Canadian Sentencing Commission’s 1987 Report on Sentencing Reform noted that
constitutional challenges to MMPs are not new.180 In 1976, the potential cruel and unusual
effects of a 7 year MMP for importation of a narcotic were discussed by the court in R v
Shand.181 While the Court of Appeal overturned the trial court’s decision to set aside the
mandatory minimum, it also acknowledged that the MMP could in some cases be unduly harsh
for some offenders.182 However, the court reasoned that this undue harshness could be
justified as a means to achieving the end of containing the drug trade.183

In 1987, in the seminal case of R v Smith,184 the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a
MMP of seven years imprisonment for importing a narcotic on s.12 grounds.185 The court set a
high threshold for punishment that is “cruel and unusual” contrary to s.12. To amount to a
Charter breach a punishment must be grossly disproportionate, meaning that it is “more than
merely excessive.”186 Such a sentence would be “so excessive as to outrage the standards of
decency.”187 The court set out a two-part test to be used in determining if a punishment is
grossly disproportionate. First, the court considers the circumstances of the offence and
offender at bar. If a MMP is so harsh in the circumstances that it could offend society’s sense of
decency, the court then considers if the infringement of s.12 is justifiable under s.1. If imposing
the MMP would not be grossly disproportionate on those grounds, then second, the court may
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consider any reasonable hypothetical scenario in which the MMP could subject an offender to
cruel and unusual punishment. Relying on the reasonable hypothetical analysis, the court in
Smith found that it would be grossly disproportionate to sentence a first time offender who
imported a single “joint of grass” to a mandatory minimum of seven years in prison.188 The
infringement on s.12 could not be saved under s.1 and thus the MMP was struck down.

In the years following, despite initial constitutional infirmity and persistent academic
criticism, the judiciary consistently deferred to Parliament on the issue of MMPs.189 Post Smith,
there was judicial reluctance in finding that MMPs can produce cruel and unusual punishment.
On four occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada grappled with the constitutionality of MMPs,
though not in the drug context. In each instance, MMPs were upheld. First, in R v Goltz a MMP
on a driving offence was upheld as it did not amount to cruel and usual punishment. There, the
court constrained the reasonable hypothetical analysis, finding that hypotheticals outside of
the imaginable circumstances of daily life could not be considered.190 To this end, some
considered the reasonable hypothetical analysis to be merely a “faint hope clause.”191 In R v
Morrisey the court followed the ruling that a reasonable hypothetical must be something that
could commonly arise in upholding a MMP.192 This position was mirrored in R v Latimer, where
a constitutional exemption was overturned and a MMP was upheld.193 Fourth in R v Ferguson,
the court upheld a MMP and confirmed that constitutional exemptions should not be used in a
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haphazard fashion to avoid the imposition of a MMP.194 Rather, the court held that a
declaration of invalidity under s.52 of the Charter is the only suitable remedy where a provision
is unconstitutional.195 The Ferguson decision split academic opinion. Some saw it as a retreat
from the scrutiny enunciated by the court in Smith, while others suggested that it sent a clear
message that the court should not continue to “mop up” messes as a result of flawed
legislation.196 This deferential line of jurisprudence represented a move from judicial “activism
to minimalism.”197 Though it should be noted that the reluctance to depart from MMPs in these
four decisions may well be rooted in the “types of offences that were before the court rather
than a change in the Court’s approach to mandatory minimums.”198

Some twenty-eight years following the Supreme Court’s initial striking down of a MMP in
Smith, two MMPs have again been struck down in recent Supreme Court decisions. In R v Nur,
the court’s earlier position in Smith was affirmed and clarified. The court found that a threeyear mandatory minimum for a firearms offence was inconsistent with s.12 of the Charter and
it was therefore declared of no force and effect. In Nur, there was a retreat from the overly
constrained reasonable hypothetical analysis, to a more broad test of reasonable
foreseeability.199 In considering reasonable foreseeability, the court “may take into account
personal characteristics relevant to people who may be caught by the mandatory minimum, but

194

R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6.
Ibid, at para 57.
196
Janani Shanmuganathan, “R. v. Nur: A Positive Step but not the Solution to the Problem of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences in Canada” (2016) 76 SCLR: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases at 334.
197
Ibid, at 333.
198
Ibid, at 332.
199
R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para 65.
195

46
must avoid characteristics that would produce remote or far-fetched examples.”200 Nur
represented a positive step forward, though not a concrete solution to the issue of MMPs
because “the problem of mandatory minimum sentences is one that is too big for the courts to
cure on their own.”201

However, Nur laid the groundwork for further judicial scrutiny of MMPs in R v Lloyd, a drug
trafficking case which is most important for current purposes. Chief Justice McLachlin writing
for the majority reasoned that “the reality is that mandatory minimum sentences for offences
that can be committed in many ways and under many different circumstances by a wide range
of people are constitutionally vulnerable because they will almost inevitably catch situations
where the prescribed mandatory minimum would require an unconstitutional sentence.”202
Lloyd confirmed the court’s stance in Nur that a sentence infringes on s.12 where it is a “grossly
disproportionate sentence on the individual before the court, or if the law’s reasonably
foreseeable applications will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on others.”203 In
finding the MMP of no force and effect, the court offered guidance to Parliament if they wished
to retain MMPs in such a way that does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment either by
narrowing the scope of MMPs or implementing an escape clause such that judges are able to
avoiding using MMPs in exceptional circumstances.204
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While unable to provide declaratory relief such that their decisions may be relied upon in
future cases outside of that province, provincial court judges frequently find drug related MMPs
to be unconstitutional in the cases before them.205 According to a 2021 study by the
Department of Justice Canada, in the last decade “69% of the constitutional challenges to
MMPs for drug offences were successful.”206 The recent decision in R v Sharma illustrates the
cruel and unusual effects of MMPs and the provincial court’s willingness to acknowledge
them.207 The case involved a 20-year old Indigenous woman, with no prior criminal record, who
is an intergenerational survivor of Canada’s colonial residential school system. The Ontario
Court of Appeal described some of Ms. Sharma’s personal circumstances including being raped
by two men at age 13, running away from home and being involved in sex work by age 15,
being forced to drop out of high school at age 16 because she could not afford a $400 uniform,
giving birth to her daughter at age 17, and dealing with serious mental health struggles
throughout.208 As a result of financial pressures and the threat of eviction for her and her twoyear old child, Ms. Sharma agreed to be a drug courier for a man she was dating and imported
cocaine from Surinam into Canada in exchange for $20,000. Upon being apprehended, she
admitted what she had done and plead guilty at the earliest opportunity. At sentencing in the
Ontario Court of Justice, the two-year mandatory minimum for importing a controlled
substance contrary to s.6(3)(a.1) was struck down because “it would have constituted cruel and
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unusual punishment when applied to Ms. Sharma and a number of reasonable hypothetical
offenders.”209 Ms. Sharma’s case is a powerful, yet not exceedingly uncommon, example of the
MMPs in practice. Because the law remains on the books, if someone in similar circumstances
to Ms. Sharma lacks the means to mount a constitutional challenge to a MMP, they may find
themselves subject to a MMP, perpetuating cycles of crime and trauma.210

Despite these perils, MMPs flourished “because they are seen as politically popular,
appealing to large segments of the electorate who have little information about the principles
and operation of the criminal justice system.”211 Much of the public’s attention is focused on
harshly punishing drug crime, while failing to recognize the nuance of the issue. In a time of fear
around serious crime, it is politically charged with popularity, though practically unwise, to take
a ‘tough on crime’ approach.212 Pursuing a solution to Canada’s drug crisis through ineffective
legal measures does a disservice to all Canadians.

As has been evidenced by the case against MMPs, they are an ineffective tool. They
erode the legitimacy of fundamental sentencing principles, displace judicial discretion, are
extremely costly, do not rehabilitate offenders nor deter crime, serve to perpetuate
unacceptable racial bias in the criminal justice system, and are particularly vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. While there has been a recent resurgence in judicial action against
MMPs at the Supreme Court, “striking down unconstitutional mandatory minimums through
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the courts is to attack the problem in a piecemeal manner.”213 Indeed, it is the role of
Parliament to take action to avert the perils of MMPs. Over the last 40 years of constitutional
uncertainty around MMPs, there has been advocacy for narrowing the scope of MMPs as they
stand, adding an escape clause similar to that of international counterparts, and for total repeal
of MMPs. Bill C-5’s proposal to entirely remove MMPs from the drug context is an essential
step forward in reversing the harms associated with MMPs and addressing Canada’s drug crisis.
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7: Bill C-5: Repealing MMPs in the CDSA
As the above discussions have outlined, Bill C-5 is broad in its proposed effect. While
falling outside of the scope of this project, it would be remiss to fail to acknowledge that Bill C-5
could shape the law around firearms and tobacco related crimes. These are complex issues that
deserve study in their own right.

Within the scope of this project, Bill C-5 is promising because removing MMPs from the
CDSA is a vital first step in addressing Canada’s drug crisis. As noted by Senator Marc Gold, Bill
C-5 will not fix all issues with the current drug situaiton, “like the social determinants of crime
and inequities in policing,” however he did reason that it will grant judges the discretion to
proportionately sentence offenders “with regard to public safety, rehabilitation and the
realities of colonialism, racism and intergenerational trauma.”214 Still, while removing MMPs
alone will not reverse all of the harms associated with Canada’s war on drugs, it is an important
measure in signalling, if not creating, a major shift in the tide. Removing MMPs will address
immediate concerns associated with MMPs. By repealing MMPs, Parliament will empower the
judiciary with the necessary discretion to sentence offenders proportionately taking into
account all circumstances of the offence and offender. There will be relief from the pressures of
increased litigation and incarceration associated with MMPs such that resources can be
redistributed in supporting Canadians in need. Those struggling with addiction will not be
coerced into participating in inaccessible and ineffective drug treatment courts. Repealing
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MMPs from the CDSA will contribute to efforts to ensure that they are not misconstrued as
effective deterrent measures. While it will not entirely address systemic racial bias in the
criminal justice system, repealing MMPs from the CDSA will ensure that certain racial groups
are not disproportionately affected by the provisions. Finally, repealing MMPs will bring the law
into compliance with recent SCC rulings on constitutionality and put an end to the
constitutional vulnerability of MMPs in the CDSA.

As Parliamentary speeches and debates, along with intervener’s policy briefs have
illustrated, Bill C-5 is imperfect. Indubitably, the most serious dilemma with Bill C-5 is what it
does not include. It does not provide additional mental health, rehabilitative, and socioeconomic supports for those who have been caught up in cycles of drug crime. For these
reasons, Parliament must go further than removing MMPs from the CDSA in addressing the
drug crisis. However, in diverting focus and resources from harshly penalizing those who are
involved in the drug trade as a means to support addiction, the government may begin to
adequately address problematic substance use as a health and social concern, by enacting
evidence-based practices and interventions to address the root causes of addiction. Thus, in the
immediate, repealing cruel and unusual drug related MMPs is essential.
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8: Conclusion
This project began by highlighting the lethal effects of the drug crisis in Canada,
indicating that Canada’s war on drugs has failed. Drugs are killing Canadians at an increasingly
alarming rate. It went on to outline drug sentencing objectives at law, highlighting the centrality
of the principle of proportionality. It provided context on MMPs and their application in, and
proposed removal from, the CDSA. Ultimately, the study explored the cases both for and
against the use of MMPs in the CDSA. While proponents suggest that harsh sentences and
decreased sentencing disparity are adequate justifications for the use of MMPs, it is clear from
this review that an overly punitive drug sentencing framework is not working to end the drug
crisis and keep Canadians safe.

The last decade has evidenced that MMPs in the CDSA interfere with the principle of
proportionality, misplace judicial discretion, increase the burden of incarceration and litigation,
rely on a flawed drug treatment court system, do not deter crime, and perpetuate systemic
racial bias in the criminal justice system. These fundamental flaws with MMPs mean that such
sentencing provisions are constitutionally vulnerable, because they can produce cruel and
unusual punishment, contrary to s.12 of the Charter. As such, MMPs have no place in Canada’s
drug policies. It is high time that Parliament permanently removes all MMPs from the CDSA,
through Bill C-5, and further commits to taking meaningful steps to reduce the harm suffered
by criminalizing drugs.
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